Resources for China Beginners
In the Hutong
Peter Rand: China Hands (****)
Richard Evans: Deng Xiaoping and the Making of Modern China: Revised Edition (****)
William Hinton: Fanshen: A Documentary of Revolution in a Chinese Village (****)
Pu Yi Aisin-Gioro: From Emperor to Citizen: The Autobiography of Aisin-Gioro Pu Yi (*****)
Andrew Nathan: Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China's Search for Security (****)
Joe Studwell: The China Dream: The Quest for the Last Great Untapped Market on Earth
Bruce Gilley: Tiger on the Brink: Jiang Zemin and China's New Elite (****)
Neal Gabler: An Empire of Their Own: How the Jews Invented Hollywood (****)
Rabbi Menachem M. Schneerson: Bringing Heaven Down to Earth: 365 Meditations of the Rebbe (*****)
Arthur Gelb: City Room (*****)
William Manchester: Goodbye, Darkness: A Memoir of the Pacific War (****)
Robert D. Kaplan: Imperial Grunts: The American Military on the Ground (*****)
Gerald Lyn Early: One Nation Under A Groove: Motown and American Culture (***)
Seth Godin: Purple Cow: Transform Your Business by Being Remarkable (****)
Robert D. Kaplan: The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dreams of the Post Cold War (****)
Sally Denton: The Money and the Power: The Making of Las Vegas and Its Hold on America (****)
Walter J. Williams: The Rift (****)
Tom Clancy: Without Remorse (****)
In the Hutong
In the Hutong
Breathing those little airborne cotton balls
2056 hrs.
Via Danwei, China Economic Review is quoting Krispy Kreme's HK CEO explaining why the confection pushers are planning to start their invasion of the People's Republic of China in Shenzhen.
"Shenzhen is a migrant city, many are from the north, and the people are more receptive to fried products."
Krispy Kreme is doomed in China.
Write it off.
It's going the way of Jack-in-the-Box. Or Wendy's.
You Don't Really Want to Be Here, Do You?
First, any company that would stoop to concocting such a nonsense justification for locating a high-value franchise somewhere is engaged in some high-level self-delusion. I would bet that real reason they're going to do Shenzhen first is that the HK CEO is getting stuck with the job on the mainland, probably likes his mid-levels flat, and doesn't want to be flying to Beijing or Shanghai all the time. Shenzhen, on the other hand, is 45 minutes from Central by car.
Second, if Krispy Kreme was really serious about China, they wouldn't hand the responsibility to a guy in Hong Kong. They would do their research and put a guy on the ground in Shanghai, Beijing, or somewhere else in China to act as representative, get to know the local government, and find local franchisees. Behaving like you need to enter China from Hong Kong, then Shenzhen, is a modus operandi far more appropriate to China's circumstances circa 1990.
Third, if Krispy Kreme really understood the way into China, they would start someplace where there are a lot of people who already like donuts, can't get them, and will form long, slavering lines outside their door each morning. If you're afraid of Shanghai, go with Beijing. Call me crazy, but tens of thousands of American and Canadian businesspeople, students, diplomats, and families seem like a built-in market for a store or ten, better (especially initially) than a million or two migrant workers and their factory bosses.
Alas, Krispy Kreme appears content to sit in Hong Kong and wait for the franchisees to come to them, and then invade the market slowly.
Watch the Other Guy Feel the Stones
Time to study the tactics of companies like Starbucks, McDonalds, KFC, Pizza Hut, Dominos, and Papa John's. They knew where their ready markets were, started with those places, put people on the ground in the mainland separate from Hong Kong, and have insanely thriving businesses today because of it.
And, as The Village Grouch correctly points out, Krispy Kreme can also build on the experience - and failure - of Dunkin Donuts in Beijing. In the late 1990s, Dunkin rolled out about 10 stores very quickly, many located in the same space as their Allied-Domecq sister company, Baskin-Robbins.
However, they did little or no consumer education, and when faced with the choice between something they knew and liked - ice cream - and the cakey things they found too sweet for their palates, the uneducated consumer went with what they knew.
Beijing is without a franchised donut store today. But that has as much to do with timing as anything, and it could be argued that the timing is far better today than it was a decade ago.
Where Giants Have Trod
American-born, Thai-based billionaire Bill Heinecke helped to bring Pizza Hut to China in the early 1990s. (If you ate at Pizza Hut in Beijing back then, thank Bill.) However, the going was slow, the joint venture arrangement difficult (as they are), and Heinecke's group sold their shares after a few years and went back to selling pizza in Thailand, which they did quite well.
After a spat with Yum Brands, the parent company of Pizza Hut, Heinecke founded his own pizza chain, The Pizza Company. Seen any of those popping up in the Hutong lately? Right.
Now, after Pizza Hut, Domino's and Papa John's (not to mention the superior product at Kro's Nest) have all established a foothold, The Pizza Company comes to a market where it must fight for a crust, rather than cut itself a large slice of the pie.
So heads up, Krispy Kreme. You have neither the money nor time to burn on timid, ill-conceived strategies in China.
A Last Word
The above said, I must add the caveat below.
Many of us still remember the days when "experts," Chinese and foreign, were saying that pizza would never sell in China because Chinese lack the enzyme required to digest cheese and other milk products. The aforementioned chains give lie to that.
Beware of people who give you reasons why something will work someplace and won't work another. There is no substitute for ignoring all of the naysayers and getting in there and trying.
Fortune in China usually tends to favor the brave and the wise. Be both.
Asia Logistics Wrap News and Commentary from Tokyo on Logistics in Asia Does the very word "logistics" threaten to put you to sleep? It used to bore the hell out of me. It doesn't anymore. Everyone has heard Napoleon's quote to the effect that "an army moves on its stomach." The short old frog would have appreciated the more modern adage that "amateurs talk about tactics, rank amateurs about grand strategy, but professionals talk about logistics." Mercifully, Shawn Beilfuss' blog doesn't obsess on the minutae of moving stuff from one part of the world to another. Instead, he takes a broad look at logistics, putting it into the context of "everything else." Reading Asia Logistics Wrap (ALR) is an eye opener. We all like to toss around big words like "infrastructure" in our conversations as shorthand for the dirty stuff that makes Asia (and the world) actually work, but ALR is a reminder that very serious issues - logistics issues - silently threaten to derail some carfully laid plans in China specifically and Asia generally. Like any good strategist with a focus, he reaches well beyond his specialty to put it into a broader context. Just reading his posts about "space logistics" was worth it for me. His posts about the growing importance of China's railways - in a day and age when other developing nations are shunning the iron rail for airports, superhighways, and container ports - are a reminder that transportation - for cargo and for people - in China is going to be very different than it is in Japan, Europe, or North America. Read Shawn, and read what he's reading. Originally posted 27 March 2007
"Plain Language Humor: How to Write Good," at PlainLanguage.gov This site provides what is probably the finest one-page reference to basic rules of good writing I've ever come across. Now, if I could only remember to use them all... Originally posted 3 January 2007
"The Risk Pool" by Malcolm Gladwell in The New Yorker, August 28, 2006 Every now and then an article or book comes along that gently but insistently challenges your assumptions. Malcolm Gladwell, whose thinking and work has been much maligned by the buzzwordification of his brilliant book The Tipping Point, pops up with this little beauty of an article in last week's The New Yorker, thankfully made available online. (NB - Speaking very late last night to The Village Grouch, we both agree that between The New Yorker, The Economist, Harvard Business Review and a handful of similarly insightful publications, we'd have to give up our jobs just to keep up with our reading. We also agreed, however, that it would be a worthy sacrifice.) Gladwell uses the article to zoom in on a single demographic statistic called "the dependency ratio," which is essentially the ratio of people who aren't of working age (children and retirees) and those who are. Citing a range of examples, both national (Ireland, China, India and Japan) and corporate (GM and Bethlehem Steel, and Google), he convincingly makes the case that comparative advantage is in no small part dependent on demographics. Clearly demographics are not the only issue - if dependency ratios told all, Africa would be an emerging economic superpower capable or rivaling Asia. Gladwell's point, however, does have broader implications: • For U.S. companies, who in the face of GM's long slow meltdown must see pension and medical benefits as a time bomb; • For the U.S. government and electorate, who now need to reassess the wisdom of allowing corporations to handle social benefits programs; • For European and Japanese governments who now must revaluate the sustainability of their immigration and social policies; and • For China, who needs to look beyond the current 11th Five Year Plan Guidelines and see that beginning in about 20 years they're going to have an immense mass or retirees to support. Chewy stuff. Originally posted 5 September 2006
"Power not socialism is today's Chinese ideology," by Richard McGregor, The Financial Times, July 25, 2006 Going back through the archives (going on vacation with the family can be murder on your reading,) I picked up an article written by Richard McGregor in the FT on July 25 in which he cogently argues that China is about power, not about socialism. By itself, that’s no stunning revelation - if anything China’s cadres, bureaucrats, and even soldiers seem daily to give greater credence to the belief that you needn’t scratch any Chinese very hard to find a capitalist. Richard’s suggestion is the suggestion that ideology in China is (cynically) little more than a convenient fig leaf to protect those in power is, similarly, an acknowledged truism. Government v. Business? But what really tickled my frontal lobes was his use of the recent rejection of the draft property law as an example of the kinds of decisions made to keep the party in power as opposed to keeping the economy moving forward. The issue Richard really wants us to understand is this: the increasingly powerful economic forces in China, represented by Big Money (the global financial establishment, including the mandarins at the People’s Bank in China) and Big Enterprise (the leaders of the reformed SOEs and medium-large local and foreign companies whose success is driving the economy,) are not the constituency to whom the Party and the government play. As befitting a publication like the FT, McGregor portrays this as a growing conflict between single-party rule and growing private interests in the PRC. That’s one way to look at it, certainly, especially if (as McGregor does) you reject the idea that any Marxist concepts have pervaded the thinking of the Party. Power of the Pitchforks I don’t see it in the same way. I think the point is that the implicit forces driving decision making in Beijing remain a concern for the perceptions of those who wield the latent power to end the Party’s rule - the workers, farmers, cadres, bureaucrats, taxi drivers and shopkeepers who make up what we all affectionately know as the lao bai xing. And they should be afraid. Take a nation where popular upheaval to is a time-honored means of governmental transition, and add in an incomplete economic development process with mind-boggling and growing inequality, and things start to look very touchy indeed. Strong, stable, pluralist societies are built on a foundation of ubiquitous property ownership - when your life is invested in an asset you cannot move, you have a pretty powerful compulsion to safeguard the system that assures its value. But when you have a society in transition, where there remain tens of millions of people in abject poverty with little to lose in following mystics and demagogues, even the appearance of playing to Big Money and Big Enterprise is a dangerous proposition. This is not about the Party vs. The Money. This is about recognizing that an ironic way, the power of China’s leaders actually does come from the people. Business and finance interests will have limited say in China until such a time as nearly everyone in the PRC is vested in the success of the system. For Big Money and Big Enterprise in China - and for any group borne of commercial concerns - this means that when your agenda operates in opposition to the improvement of the lot of the Chinese people, your agenda has no hope, and that the best way to get your way in China is to make improving the lives of “the masses” an implicit part of what you do here. Originally posted 7 September 2006